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Comment
"EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE, EVERY MOVE YOU MAKE, I'LL BE
WATCHING YOU"': THE USE OF FACE
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a day in the not too distant future when you go to Big
Brother Corporation to apply for a job. After filling out an application,
submitting a resume and the requisite references, you are granted an interview. After spending the morning meeting with various employees of
the Corporation, you are told that unfortunately, they will be unable to
hire you. When you inquire as to why, you are informed that the employer
does not feel you are suited to work at Big Brother Corporation. As it
turns out, while you were being interviewed, a camera in the office took a
digital photograph of you that was then scanned through a database of
mug shots and driver's license photographs. Your photograph was
matched with the photo from your driver's license, pulling up your entire
history: any police record, credit history, medical history, even a list of
items you have purchased with your credit card. Based on your personal
record, they are convinced you are not suited for employment with Big
Brother Corporation.
While such a scenario, on its face, appears improbable, it now seems
that George Orwell's fears for the future, once thought of as far fetched,
have become a reality. 2 Recent technological innovations have made it
possible to not only instantly recognize individuals, but also to track their
movements and recall their entire history within seconds. 3 The use of face
1. THE POLICE, Every Breath You Take, on SYNCHRONICITY (A&M Records 1983).
2. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Reprint ed. 1990) (referring to concept
of book). In Orwell's 1949 novel, he flashes forward to a future when Big Brother
monitors your every move. See generally id. (describing backgrotnd of novel). The
notion that video monitoring devices would be present everywhere seemed inconceivable at the time the book was published; however, given the recent advances in
technology, Orwell's scenario seems more real than ever. See Grayson Barber, Living on the Wrong Side of a One-Way Mirror:FaceRecognition Technology and Video Surveillance, ChipCenter-QuestLink, at http://www.chipcenter.com/columns/COL_
20010718.html (July 18, 2001) (noting Orwell's portrayal of "the condition of life
in a tyrannical police state"); Agnes Blum, Beach Surveillance Plan Gets More Critics,
& LEDGER-STAR,
at http://www.pilotonline.com/news/
VIRGINIAN
PILOT
nw0711nay.html (July 11, 2001) (observing that proposal to use face recognition
technology has "Orwellian overtones").
3. See generally Robert O'Harrow Jr., Matching Faces with Mug Shots, WASH.
POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at Al (recognizing advancements in technology); Charles
Piller, et al., CriminalFaces in the Crowd Still Elude Hidden ID Cameras, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2001, at Al (same); Kathleen Ellis, ID Them By the Way They Walk, WIRED
NEWS (Sept. 15, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,38775,00.

(955)
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recognition technology, introduced to the world during the 2001 Super
Bowl, is rapidly expanding in the wake of growing security concerns, stemming from the events of September 11, 2001.4
This Comment focuses on facial recognition technology and the privacy problems that arise from its use. Because this technology is just
emerging from its developmental stages, its legality remains untested in
court. 5 Although the government's use of this technology appears to fall
within Constitutional bounds, its use by third parties may pose more of a
threat. 6 Part II of this Comment discusses how facial recognition technology works, as well as how it has been used in the past. 7 With the expanding use of this technology, it is important to examine its potential
legal implications.8 Part III briefly discusses the history of privacy in public places.9 Part IV analyzes the United States Supreme Court's treatment
of privacy in public places and its application to the use of facial recognition technology. I" Finally, Part V discusses the future use of facial recogni-

html (same); Julia Scheeres, Smile, You're on Scan Camera, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 14,
2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42317,00.html. (same).
4. See generally Editorial, Digital Big Brother, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Feb. 5,
2001, at C18 (noting use of face recogniation technology at 2001 Super Bowl);
Mary Huhn, Just a Face in the Crowd?-Superbowl Kicked Off the Use of Face Recognition
Software-but Is this an Invasion of Privacy?, N.Y. PosT, June 26, 2001, at 51 (same);
Martin Kasindorf, 'Big Brother' Cameras on Watch For Criminals,USA TODAY, Aug. 2,
2001, at A3 (same); Peter Slevin, Police Video Cameras Taped Football Fans; Super Bowl
Surveillance Stirs Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al (same); Robert Trigaux,
Cameras Scanned Fans for Criminals, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at IA
(same); Kevin Anderson, Anger over Face-Scanning Cameras, BBC News (Aug. 20,
2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1500017.stm (same); On January
28th, Criminals no Longer Another Face in the Tampa Stadium Crowd, Viisage Tech.,
Inc., at http://www.viisage.com/january-29_2001.htm (Jan. 29, 2001) (same).
5. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/columns/
COL_20010718.html (noting surveillance remains untested in court); Kenneth P.
Nuger, Biometric Applications: Legal and Societal Considerations,Nat'l Biometric Test
Ctr. (2001), at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_consideration.
html (commenting that this new technology has yet to be addressed in court).
6. See Nuger, supra note 5, at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/ biometrics/publicationsconsideration.html (recognizing that privacy issues arise from third party use
of biometrics); Janelle K. Prevost, Biometrics with Limited Government Intervention:
How to Providefor Privacy and Security Requirements of Networked Digital Environments,
MIT ETHICS & L. ON ELEC. FRONTIER (Fall 1999), at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/
6.805/student-papers/fa199-papers/prevost-biometrics.html
(analyzing various
privacy problems arising from use of new technology).
7. For a further discussion of how face recognition technology works and its
use, see infra notes 12-72 and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion of the legality of the use of face recognition technology, see infra notes 110- 47 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of the history of privacy in public places, see infra
notes 73-109 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the privacy issues that arise from the use of face
recognition technology, see infra notes 111-48 and accompanying text.
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tion technology and electronic surveillance in light of growing security
fears throughout the United States and the world. 11

II.

USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

A.

Biometrics-An Introduction

Biometrics refers to the way in which humans can be identified by the
unique characteristics of their bodies. 12 Currently, humans are identified
in many ways, including fingerprints and facial features,with the most common form quickly becoming face recognition. 13 Although fingerprints
and faces are the most common forms of biometric identifiers, they are
certainly not the only ones. 14 Scientists are currently working on numerous forms of identification, hoping to one day reach the goal of identify15
ing individuals wherever they go, even up to a half mile away.
11. For a further discussion of the future use of face recognition technology,
see infra notes 148-78 and accompanying text.
12. See Biometrics Introduction, Axis Tech, at http://www.axistech.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2002) (defining biometrics); Beth Givens, Privacy Today: A Review of
Current Issues, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (Mar. 2001), at http://www.privacy
rights.org/ar/Privacy-lssuesList.htm (same); Ross Kerber, Face Off BOSTON GLOBE
ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2001), at http://www.digitalmass.boston.com/companies/
globe-profiles/2001/08/viisage2.html (same); William W. Wilson, Letter Regarding
CA Legislation, Int'l Biometric Indus. Ass'n (June 18, 2001), at http://www.ibia.
org/calegletter061801.htm (same).
13. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com
(identifying fingerprints and facial features as two forms of biometric identification); Givens, supra note 12, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Privacy-ssuesList.htm (listing forms of biometric identification). Face recognition technology
takes two forms: surveillance and identification. See Scheeres, supra note 3, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42317,00.html
(describing types of
face recognition technology). Although there are, undoubtedly, a number of privacy issues that surround the use of this technology for surveillance, this Comment
will focus mainly on its use for identification purposes.
14. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com
(describing forms of biometric identification); Givens, supra note 12, at http://
www. privacyrights.org/ar/Privacy-IssuesList.htm (discussing types of biometric
identification). The number of characteristics used to identify individuals is rapidly growing.
See Biometrics Introduction, supra note
12, at http://
www.axistech.com/ (examining "human traits that can be used in biometrics").
Currently, humans are being identified by their fingerprints, voice, face, retina,
iris, handwriting, hand geometry, finger geometry, palm recognition and signature
recognition. See id. (listing types of biometric identification). Each of these different forms of recognition works in its own way to create a specific and unique map
of the personal characteristic that is then matched against a database in search of a
match. See id. (noting mechanics of biometric technology).
15. See Ellis, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,38775,00.html (discussing plans for future forms of identification). At the
Biometric Consortium 2000 Conference, co-sponsored by the National Security
Agency, researchers unveiled a new software program designed to identify individuals by the way they walk. See id. (discussing new program). This new technology
is designed to "isolat[e] ... a 'signature of human motion'" and allow individuals
to be identified by the way they walk, thereby working even if an individual's face is
not visible to the surveillance cameras. See id. (detailing potential capabilities of
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Face recognition technology works by creating a "map" of the face
from a photograph that a surveillance camera takes. 16 Each face has
eighty distinctive points that are recorded from the photograph. 1 7 Once
these distinctive points are mapped, they are translated into a unique set
of numbers, using a sophisticated algorithm, from which a face map is
created. 8 Once this map is created, it is scanned through a database of
stored face maps.' 9 Only fourteen to twenty-two points need to line up in
order to make a match. 20 If the computer program signals a match, the
original photograph and the photograph it was matched with are displayed side by side on a screen.2 1 Then, whoever is monitoring the
system). Other identification systems tinder development include an effort to install an electronic pen and pad system onto personal computers that would allow
individuals to develop a unique signature that establishes their identities. See id.
(explaining other forms of identification on display at Biometric Consortium).
16. See O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (discussing ability to map facial features); Editorial, Owens'BalancingAct, DENVER POST, July 20, 2001, at B6 (revealing
that computer program creates map of individual's face).
17. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 1, 2000, at A15 (explaining how face recognition technology works);
Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (detailing mechanics of face recognition
technology).
18. See Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (identifying measurement of facial characteristics as method of new technology); Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (detailing
how facial scans work); John D. Woodward, Jr., And Now, the Good Side of Facial
Profiling,WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2001, at B4 (discussing measurement of distance and
angles of face to map face); Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/sci/tech/1500017.stm (examining how facial scans take facial features and
transform them into numerical codes); FacialRecognition, Viisage Tech., at http://
www.viisage.com/facialrecog.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2002) (discussing mechanics of technology); Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42317,00.html (noting use of "numerical codes" to map faces).
19. See Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (defining method of technology);
O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (mentioning use of stored database of images);
A CLU Probes Police Use of Facial-Recognition Surveillance Cameras in Florida City, Am.
Civil Liberties Union (July 6, 2001), at http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/
n070601a.html (describing process of face recognition).
20. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, supra note 17, at
A15 (explaining how face recognition technology matches points in order to identify someone); Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (detailing process of matching
faces).
21. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, supra note 17, at
Al5 (discussing what happens when computer signals match); Slevin, supra note 4,
at Al (stating that apparent matches were "flashed side by side onto a computer
screen"). This is not the only method of face recognition technology. See Piller et
al., supra note 3, at Al (discussing methods of face recognition). Another form of
technology involves taking a photograph of the face and then developing a
faceprint by measuring the size of an individual's facial features. See id. (identifying different methods of matching faces). Calculating the width of a nose or the
space between the eyes can provide a more accurate means of face recognition
because these measurements do not change, even if the individual ages, gains
weight or grows facial hair. See id. (describing capabilities of system to account for
changes in appearance).
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screens, either police or security, decides whether or not the faces are ac22
tually a match.
This technology was formulated in the early 1990s with a Department
of Defense (DOD) initiative called the FERET Program. 23 The program
was designed to determine whether it would be possible to use algorithms
accurately to measure human faces. 24 The government allocated $6.5 mil25
lion to several universities that were enlisted to assist in the program.
22. See Slevin, supra note 4, at Al (stating once potential match was found
police had to determine whether match was accurate). Biometric technology
serves two main functions: identification and verification. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com (detailing function of biometric
technology). Identification is the process by which an individual's photograph is
scanned through a database of photos (criminals, runaways, etc.) in search of a
match. See id. (stating purpose of identification systems). Verification is the
method by which an individual's photograph is scanned through a database of
stored users. See id. (noting purpose of verification systems). Verification is often
employed by businesses who use the technology to identify their employees. See id.
(detailing use of verification technology by numerous corporations).
23. See O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (indicating facial recognition technology began through DOD initiative); Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1 294,42317,00.html (identifying FERET program as
beginning of serious research in face recognition).
24. See Dep't of Def., FERET Overview, Dep't of Def. Counterdrug Tech. Dev.
Program Office, at http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/
Feret.feret.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (delineating steps and purpose of FERET
program). The DOD Counterdrug Technology Development Program Office began the FERET program in September 1993 with the goal of developing "automatic face recognition capabilities that could be employed to assist security,
intelligence, and law enforcement personnel in the performance of their duties."
Id.
25. See id. (noting government funding of program). The program had three
main elements: sponsorship of the research, collecting a database and performing
evaluations. See id. (listing steps taken in FERET program). Once the participating groups were chosen, the FERET database of images was formed between August 1993 and July 1996, consisting of 14,126 images, including 1199 individuals
and 365 duplicate images. See id. (detailing formation of database). For some of
the duplicate images, over two years had passed between the first photograph and
the second, allowing researchers to study the effect that changes in an individual's
appearance could have. See id. (allowing for changes in appearance to measure
accuracy of system).
While the database was being compiled, the individual research groups were
working on developing their algorithm-based programs. See id. (discussing work of
individual groups involved in program). All of the groups receiving funding were
required to participate in a number of evaluations. See id. (detailing purpose and
content of individual evaluations). The first set of evaluations, in August 1994
were designed to measure the ability of the algorithms to accurately identify individuals' faces in a database. See id. (stating goal of evaluation was to measure ability
of system to "automatically locate, normalize, and identify faces"). In March 1995,
the second set of evaluations measured the algorithms in a larger database of
images. See id. (observing expanded database was used for second evaluation).
The final set of evaluations took place in September 1996 and consisted of a full
set of performance tests that measured the ability of the algorithms to identify
individuals in a number of different situations. See id. (discussing final evaluation
procedure for systems).
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The program concluded in 1998, with private corporations waiting anxiously to capitalize on the new technology. 26 Subsequently, in November
27
This new
2000, the DOD initiated the Human ID at a Distance program.
that
technology
to
develop
the
government
effort
by
was
an
program
or
in
alone,
"'humans
could not only identify humans, but could identify
28
dark."
the
in
and
distances'
great
from
groups,
26. See id. ("Many of the algorithms that took part in FERET form the foundation of today's commercial systems."). The FERET program was officially completed in 1998 and program funding totaled over $6.5 million. See id.
(summarizing FERET progam). The FERET program was one of the first to
demonstrate the viability of using algorithm-based systems to identify individuals,
thus leading to the development of many of the current face recognition systems.
See id. (noting importance of FERET program).
27. See Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (explaining Human ID program);
O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (stating program is part of "anti-terrorism initiative"); Woodward, supra note 18, at B4 (observing that Human ID program began
in response to terrorist attack on Khobar Towers).
28. See Dep't of Def., 1F,,RET Overview, supra note 24, at http://
www.dodcounterdrug.com/facial recognition/Feret.feret.htm (examining new
DOD initiatives); Human ID at a Distance, Information Awareness Office, at http://
www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (detailing Human ID program). The Human ID at a Distance program is a four year program that picks up
where the FERET program left off and is designed to improve the capabilities of a
number of biometric systems. See Dep't of Def., FERET Overview, supra note 24, at
http://www.dodcounterdrug.com/facial recognition/FERET.feret.htm (noting
purpose of program). The DOD is spending $50 million to improve the accuracy
of biometrics and increase the ability of technology to identify "non-cooperative
subjects." See id. (same). The system would be designed to operate at all times of
day and would "automatically create folders for collecting data on repeat visitors."
See Human ID at a Distance, supra, at http://www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm (explaining automatic features of Human ID system). With the dramatic expectation for
the new program, there are a number of possible problems that the new program
faces. See id. (detailing problems associated with new program).
The challenges facing the Human ID program are:
(1) develop systems to recognize non-cooperative and un-cooperative
subjects at a distance of up to 500 feet from the acquisitions
sensor(s);
(2) develop systems that identify people from multiple biometrics or sensors by fusing multiple biometrics and switching between different
biometric signatures that are designed to function under varying operating conditions, i.e., different lighting or weather conditions;
(3) increase the number of scenarios to which identification technologies can be applied (e.g., notifying authorities when a person appears
multiple days at one site or is spotted at different sites and the person
is not known to the system); and
(4) advance evaluation methodologies to a point where they establish an
identification and surveillance science that will
(a) determine fundamental limits of biometrics,
(b) determine the effects of varying data sets on performance,
(c) establish standard protocols for collecting data sets, evaluating
systems, and designing experiments, and
(d) scientifically identify critical factors that affect performance.
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Because of this urge to identify people in groups, from great distances
or in the dark, accuracy is one of the most important concerns surrounding this new technology.2 9 Face recognition systems are designed to accommodate a variety of changes in facial features while still accurately
identifying faces. 30 Any change in age, facial hair, weight or even the presence or absence of glasses should, ideally, not interfere with the program's
3

accuracy.

1

Nevertheless, despite all attempts to maintain accuracy, the technology is not foolproof.3 2 Recent studies have indicated a rather large percentage of error in the new technology.3 3 The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently conducted a study to measure
the accuracy of face recognition systems.3 4 According to the results, posed
photos of a person, taken only eighteen months apart, were rejected by
the system, which indicated no match approximately forty-three percent of
the time. 3 5 An anticipated DOD study is expected to confirm these
6
statistics.

3

29. See Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al ("Experts warn that covert digital facial
scans can be highly unreliable in public settings . .. ."); Scheeres, supra note 3, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42317,00.htm (admitting "the technology has severe limitations").
30. See O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (quoting Visionics corporation's claim
that "its software is able to account for changes").
31. See id. (noting ability of system to maintain accuracy); Piller et al., supra
note 3, at Al (observing that certain facial features in adults do not change in
response to age, weight gain or other changes).
32. See Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (stating "technology is still far from
foolproof'); see also Frequently Asked Questions, Identix Inc., at http://
www.identix.com/newsroom/face-faqs.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (answering frequently asked questions regarding face recognition technology). According
to Identix Incorporated, there are four major causes of face recognition failure:
glare on eyeglasses that obstructs a clear view of the face, presence of long hair that
falls in front of the face and prevents a clear photograph from being taken, poor
lighting and a lack of resolution in the photograph, preventing a clear and accurate picture. See id. (listing causes of failure).
33. See Piller et al., supranote 3, at Al (observing that "digitized photos shot at
an angle or in poor light create images that often fail to match existing mug
shots").
34. See id. (examining testing by NIST).
35. See id. (disclosing failure rates of new technology).
36. See Dep't of Def., FacialRecognition Vendor Test 2000 Overview, Dep't of Def.
Counterdrug Tech. Dev. Program Office, at http://dodcounterdrug.com/
facialrecognition/FRVT2000/frvt2000.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (summarizing Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000); Laura Kinsler, City Council Narrowly Supports Face Scanning, TBO.com (Aug. 3, 2001), at http://www.abatesc.com/news/
news-6-aug-Ol.htm (analyzing accuracy of face recognition technology). From May
toJune 2000, the DOD performed the Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000, which
was designed to evaluate the capabilities of a number of face recognition systems
that are currently available in the United States. See Dep't of Def., FacialRecognition
Vendor Test 2000 Overview, supra, at http://dodcounterdrug.com/facialrecognition/ FRVT2000/fvt2000.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2002) (detailing Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000). The test was aimed at aiding government agencies in
their search for added security measures, by demonstrating the capabilities of the
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The results of face recognition systems can trigger false "matches" or
false "rejections" for any number of reasons. 3 7 For example, bad lighting,
the glare of eye glasses, facial hair and the angle at which the photograph
38
Even in conis taken can all interfere with the accuracy of the results.
trolled circumstances, with posed photos, the results remain less than
completely accurate. 3 9 The inaccuracies are even greater when the photos
are taken of random individuals on the street because the surveillance
40
cameras are often not able to take photographs of individuals head on.

various systems available. See id. (specifying that goal of test was to evaluate availa-

ble face recognition systems). The test was divided into two parts: the first part was
designed to test the ability of all of the algorithm-based systems to see how they
perform, the second test allowed each vendor to set up his or her system using the
necessary cameras, lighting and other equipment needed for his or her system to
perform. See id. (detailing format of test). The test used two timed portions to
determine the ability of the system to operate accurately under a given set of circumstances. See id. (reviewing use of time in order to test accuracy of systems).
The DOD's tests were performed in government labs and under controlled
circumstances, however, outside of these controlled circumstances, the accuracy of
the systems decreases. See Kinsler, supra,at http://www.abatesc.com/news/news-6aug-01.htm (assessing reality of accuracy of system).
37. See Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/studentpapers/fal199papers/prevost-biometrics.html (evaluating accuracy of face recognition). Once a face is mapped and scanned through the computer system, there
are two possible problems that may arise: false acceptance and false rejection. See
id. (identifying potential problems with matching). False acceptance occurs when
an individual is wrongly matched with a photograph in the system. See id. (explaining cause of false acceptance). False rejection occurs when an individual is rejected, even though he or she is an accurate match for someone in the computer
database. See id. (analyzing cause of false rejection).
38. See Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (recognizing inaccuracies of technology); Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42317,00.html (observing potential for system to be fooled).
39. See Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (citing results of NIST studies). Although face recognition technology remains less than one hundred percent accurate, the developers of the technology are making strides. See Visionics, Visionics
Introduces Fourth Generation-G4-FaceltEngine, Yahoo! Finance (Oct. 1, 2001), at
http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/011001/10293_.html (presenting advances in system's
capabilities). Just recently, Visionics unveiled the latest version of their Facelt
software, the software being used in Tampa, Florida. See id. (detailing new system).
The newest version, G4, has recently completed strict government testing through
the Facial Vendor Test 2000. See id. (noting performance in Facial Vendor Test
2000). For a complete discussion of the Facial Recognition Vendor Test 2000, see
supra note 36. The results of the testing prove that Visionics new program is the
most effective of all of the systems tested, demonstrating notable improvements in
the system's ability to accurately match faces, compensate for poor lighting and
generally reduce false alarms. See Visionics, supra, at http://biz.yahoo.com/bw/
011001/10293_1.html (detailing capabilities of newest system).
40. See Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42317,00.html (observing inaccuracies of technology).
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B.

The 2001 "Snooperbowl'4 1

The 2001 Super Bowl marked the first time the general public was
introduced to the use of face recognition technology. 42 Although previously used in a variety of capacities, the Super Bowl was one of the first
times this technology was tested and used on a large scale in the United
use of this
States.4 3 This led a number of individuals concerned with the
44
technology to dub the 2001 Super Bowl the "Snooperbowl."
From January 21 through January 28, 2001, Graphco Technologies,
Inc. provided a surveillance and facial recognition system for Tampa's Raymond James Stadium and two other venues hosting Super Bowl related
activities. 45 As the 71,000 Super Bowl spectators entered the four main
gates of Raymond James Stadium, approximately twenty cameras recorded
41. See generally Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/sci/tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (referring to the 2001 Super Bowl
as "Snooperbowl"); Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (same).
42. See Barbara Dority, A Brave New World-Or a Technological Nightmare? Big
Brother is Watching!, HUMANIST, May 1, 2001, at 9 (examining events at 2001 Super
Bowl); Huhn, supra note 4, at 51 ("[Face recognition's] first presence on the
worldwide stage kicked off in Tampa, Fla., in January this year at Super Bowl
XXXV."); Givens, supra note 12, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Privacy-IssuesList.htm (indicating Super Bowl was first time Americans learned of face recognition technology); Julia Scheeres, Face Scanners Turn Lens on Selves, WIRED NEws
(July 31, 2001), at http:// www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,45687,00.html (observing that face recognition technology "first gained public notoriety" at Super
Bowl).
43. See Kerber, supra note 12, at http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/232/
business/Face_offP.shtml (observing "technology was able tojump rapidly from an
obscure corner of military-and-security research into the arsenal of a metropolitan
police force"); Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42317,00.html (citing previous uses of technology). The system used at the
2001 Super Bowl was created by Graphco Technologies, Inc., however it is not the
only company that specializes in this type of technology. See Slevin, supra note 4, at
Al (quoting Graphco Technologies's managing director). Currently, there are
over twenty companies that manufacture facial recognition systems. See Scheeres,
supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42317,00.html (noting
number of companies that produce face recognition systems).
44. See generally Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (nicknaming 2001 Super Bowl
based on use of face recognition technology); Lauren Weinstein, Be Seeing You!, 5/
1/01 COMM. ACM 128 (May 1, 2001) (same); ACLU Calls for Public Hearings on
Tampa's "Snooper Bowl" Video Surveillance, Am. Civil Liberties Union (Feb. 1, 2001),
at http://archive.aclu.org/news/2001/n020101a.html (same); Anderson, supra
note 4, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsidj500000/
1500017.stm (same); Jay Lyman, Critics Blast U.S. Ties to 'Snooper Bowl' Technology,
Yahoo! News (Aug. 1, 2001), at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/nf/20010802/
tc/12458_l.html (same); Julia C. Martinez, Owens: Hold Off on Face-ID Technology,
DENVERPOST.COM (July 19, 2001), at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/
0,1002,53%257E70770,00.html (same).
45. See On January 28th, Criminals no Longer Another Face in the Tampa Stadium
Crowd, supra note 4, at http://www.viisage.com/january-29-2001.htm (discussing
use of Graphco Technologies's system at Super Bowl); Tampa Uses Cameras to Scan
for Wanted Faces, (July 2, 2001) at http://cnn.com/2001/TECH/ptech/07/02/
high.tech.security.ap/ (noting presence of system at Super Bowl).
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dozens of images. 46 These images were fed into computers and ran
against a database of photographs. 4 7 The same process occurred at two
48
other locations in Tampa where various Super Bowl events occurred.
Prior to the Super Bowl, Tampa police provided Graphco Technologies with a database of 1700 individuals who were convicted of various
crimes ranging from ticket scalping to violent crimes. 49 During the event,
the system registered nineteen hits, eighteen of which the police decided
were false positives. 5° The one hit that the police believed was accurate
was an individual who had a history of ticket scalping. 5 1 By the time an
officer was dispatched to find the suspect, however, the suspect had disappeared.5 2 This incident demonstrates one of the system's major drawbacks: Although the technology is capable of scanning approximately
seventy million images per minute, it still does not operate fast enough to
53
allow the police to immediately identify and approach suspects.
46. See DigitalBig Brother, supra note 4, at C18 (reporting presence of 71,000
spectators at Super Bowl); Huhn, supra note 4, at 51 (noting presence of cameras
at turnstiles); Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (noting presence of cameras at every
turnstile); Anderson, supra note 4, at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ sci/
tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (discussing use of cameras at game); Declan
McCullagh, Call it Super Bowl Face Scan I, WIRED NEWS (Feb. 2, 2001), at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0, 1294,41571,00.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2002) (explaining how face recognition software secretly scanned every face at 2001 Super
Bowl); Trigaux, supra note 4, at http://www.sptimes.com/News/013101/
news-pf/TampaBay?Cameras scannedfans_.shtml (reporting use of twenty-two
cameras at Super Bowl).
47. See Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at C18 (noting images of fans being
scanned); Slevin, supra note 4, at Al (observing scanning of attendees); McCullagh, supra note 46, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41571,00.html
("Face-recognition software surreptitiously scanned everyone passing through
turnstiles .......
); Trigaux, supra note 4, at http://www.sptimes.com/News/
013101/news pPTampaBay? Camerasscannedfans_.shtml (discussing how each
person entering stadium was photographed).
48. See On January 28th, Criminals no Longer Another Face in the Tampa Stadium
Crowd, supra note 4, at http://www.viisage.com/january-29-2001.htm (noting
presence of cameras at stadium and other areas hosting Super Bowl events).
49. See Piller et al., supra note 3, at Al (discussing events at 2001 Super Bowl).
50. See id. (reporting on matches made); see also Editorial, Super Day for Big
Brother, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at B8 (noting number of matches at Super Bowl);
Slevin, supra note 4, at Al (discussing success of system); Tampa Uses Cameras to
Scan for Wanted Faces, supra note 45, at http://cnn.com/2001/TECH/ptech/07/
02/high.tech. security.ap/ (explaining that system made nineteen matches, but
there were no arrests).
51. See Slevin, supra note 4, at Al (discussing identification of individual at
Super Bowl).
52. See id. (explaining how suspect disappeared before police could question
him).
53. See Piller, supra note 3, at Al (noting observations of Professor Doug
Tygar). Doug Tygar, University of California, Berkeley professor of computer science noted that "[n]o system works fast enough to immediately apprehend a suspect before that person melts into the crowd." Id. Because of the delay between
the time a photograph is taken, scanned through the database and a match is
made, it will be difficult for police to apprehend suspects. See id. (discussing delay
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C.

On the Street Where You Live

Even before its use at the Super Bowl, Tampa officials decided to integrate face recognition technology into their arsenal of crime fighting techniques. 54 Today, as people walk down the streets of Tampa, Florida's
historic Ybor City, they are greeted by signs stating "Area Under Video
Monitoring." 55 On approximately every block, tall poles support a total of
thirty-six surveillance cameras that are constantly swiveling to monitor citizens strolling through the often crowded entertainment district. 56 At a
nearby location, police monitor ten video screens and search for matches
between faces from the street and those found in a database of felons and
runaways. 57 Many Ybor City residents are not pleased with the constant
presence of cameras in their hometown. 58 For example, since the cameras installation, demonstrations and questions regarding privacy have
resulting in difficulty in apprehension). This technology is designed to be used in
places where individuals are not simply standing around, but are constantly moving, thereby making the apprehension of a potential suspect extremely difficult.
See id. (noting use of technology in commercial arenas).
54. See Kerber, supra note 12, at http://www.boston.com/ dailyglobe2/232/
business/Face_offP.shtml (noting presence of system, in Tampa, years before use
at Super Bowl). Ybor City was chosen as one of the first cities to test out this new
technology because a $45 million improvement plan left the city capable of installing the cameras and cables necessary for the system. See Logan Nakyanzi, Smile,
You're on Not-So-Candid Camera, ABC News.com, at http://www.abcnews.go. com/
sections/scitech/DailyNews/surveilcams010703.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2002)
(discussing why Tampa's Ybor City was chosen to test system).
55. Kasindorf, supra note 4, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/
2001-08-02-big-brother-cameras.htm (describing city's use of face recognition technology and constitutionality of such technology).
56. See id. (reporting presence of cameras in Tampa); Nakyanzi, supra note
54, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/surveilcamsO10703.html (describing use of cameras).
57. See Kasindorf, supra note 4, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/
2001-08-02-big-brother-cameras.htm (describing police monitoring); Nakyanzi,
DailyNews/
supra note 54, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/
surveilcams010703.html (noting use of 30,000 photographs in database); Proposal
Wants to Keep Big Brother's Eye Shut, Yahoo! News (Aug. 21, 2001), at http://
dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/wjxt/20010821/lo/889412_1.html (discussing use of
technology in Tampa).
58. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/
tech/ newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (reporting on protests); Robert MacMillan,
Jacksonville Official Fights Face-Recognition Technology, Newsbytes (Aug. 23, 2001), at
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/169348.html (discussing unhappiness with
use of technology); Mac McKerral, Ybor City: Eye in the Sky, CatchingCrooks on the Sly,
TAMPA BAY Bus. J., July 20, 2001 (mentioning residents' unhappiness with cameras
being used to watch them); Proposal Wants to Keep Big Brother's Eye Shut, supra note
57, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/wjxt/ 20010821/lo/889412_l.html (reporting on citizens' dislike of technology). This July, about 100 people protested
the use of the cameras. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/ sci/tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (reporting on protests). Some
City Council members have also expressed their concern with the use of the cameras. See id. (expressing concern of City Council members).
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caused the Tampa City Council to reconsider the use of the surveillance
5 91
system.
As a result of the technology's initial uses at the Super Bowl and in
Tampa, other states are moving toward incorporating this new form of
surveillance into their own standard procedures. 60 For example, Colorado passed a bill in mid-2001 requiring an individual to have his or her
picture taken when applying for or renewing a driver's license. 61 The
state will then compile the photos into a database of Colorado drivers to
scan for individuals with outstanding warrants or criminal histories. 62 The
state will also enter these photographs into a larger federal database that is
59. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co. uk/hi/english/sci/
tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (discussing Council's vote); Kinsler, supra
note 36, at http://www.abatesc.com/news/news-6-aug-O1.htm (reporting vote of
City Council); Robert MacMillan, Tampa Face-Recognition Vote Rattles Privacy GroupUpdate, Newsbytes (Aug. 3, 2001), at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/Ol/
168677.html (noting controversy in City Council over use of technology). Recently, two City Council members motioned to have the city terminate its contract
for its use of the face recognition system. See Kinsler, supra note 36, at http://
www.abatesc.com/news/news-6-aug-01.htm (discussing controversy in City Council). Although the decision to cancel the contract was left up to the sole discretion
of Mayor Dick Greco, the City Council vote was a chance to gauge the response to
recent questions regarding the privacy concerns arising from using this new technology. See id. (recognizing importance of vote). Nevertheless, the Council narrowly voted to maintain the system until it is demonstrated that the system does not
work. See id. (reporting final vote).
60. See Blum, supra note 2, at http://www.pilotonline.com/news/
nw0711nay.html (discussing Virginia's plan to implement new technology). Virginia is one state that is making plans to install face recognition technology in
order to beef up security at its oceanfront. See id. (reporting Virginia's plan to
install system). Currently, Virginia Beach's police department is in the process of
constructing a presentation aimed at getting the city council to approve the implementation of the new technology. See id. (documenting Virginia's plan). Even
though there has not yet been a formal proposal made, many city council members, as well as the mayor, have come out against the plan, claiming that "[i]t's
definitely like Big Brother." Id. (reporting local government's reaction to plan).
The police hope to compile a database filled with photographs of criminals, runaways and missing people. See id. (noting police's plan to create database to help
capture criminals and missing people). The city may be the potential recipient of
a $150,000 grant from the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice, which would
leave only $50,000 that the city would have to contribute. See id. (discussing grant
and costs to city in order to implement new technology).
61. SeeJulia C. Martinez, Colo. to 'Map' Faces of Drivers, DENVERPOST.COM (July
4, 2001), available at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1002,11%257E57823,
00.html (noting "[o]ld driver's license photos will be scanned into a computer
database .... "); Martinez, supra note 44, at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/
0,1002,53%257E70770,00.html (discussing new law); Editorial, Now, High-Tech Mug
Shots, DENVER POST.COM (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.denverpost.com/
Stories/0,1002,417%257E62231,00.html (discussing new license system).
62. See Martinez, supra note 61, at http://denverpost.com/ Stories/
0,1002,11%257E57823,00.html (discussing law requiring picture for all who want
driver's license); Martinez, supra note 44, at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/
0,1002, 53%257E70770,00.html (describing new law); Now, High-Tech Mug Shots,
supra note 61, at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1002,417%257E62231,00.
html (reporting on new plan for driver's license photographs).
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currently under construction. 63 A backlash from the citizens of Colorado,
however, has caused the state to reconsider its new policy. 64 Colorado's
governor asked the state to postpone implementing the new program in
order to examine the potential privacy abuses that might arise from the
technology's use.

65

The United States is not the only country utilizing face recognition
systems. 66 In fact, England was one of the first nations to capitalize on this

new technology. 67 Since the fall of 1998, Newham, England, a borough of
London, began monitoring its citizens with the same face recognition system used at the Super Bowl. 68 Cameras monitor the area and try to match
the images against a database of known criminals. 69 As a result, many
credit the system with helping to reduce crime in the area by almost forty
percent in the first year alone. 70 British officials were so impressed with
63. See Martinez, supra note 61, at http://denverpost.com/Stories/
0,1002,11%257E57823,00.htmi (noting use of database); Martinez, supra note 44,
at http:// www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1002,53%257E70770,00.html (reporting on use of license photographs); Now, High-Tech Mug Shots, supra note 61, at
http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1002,417%257E62231,00.html (discussing
use of photographs).
64. See Julia C. Martinez, Approval of Facial Mapping Reviewed, DENVER POST,
July 15, 2001, at A8 (discussing review of new policy); Owens' BalancingAct, supra

note 16, at A12 ("We're in favor of using face recognition to stop identity theft and

catch crooks, but we don't want government using it to snoop on ordinary
citizens.").
65. See Martinez, supra note 64, at A8 (noting "Owens said he's considering an
executive order to place safeguards into the law to prevent use of the new technology to further invade citizens' privacy."); Owens'BalancingAct, supra note 16, at Al2
(discussing Governor Owens's call to revisit new policy). Many of the state

lawmakers have acknowledged that when they were voting to approve the new policy, they were not aware that they were actually voting to install face recognition
technology. See Martinez, supra note 64, at A8 (noting confusion over policy).
66. For a further discussion of other countries that have instituted this new
technology, see infra notes 152-53.
67. See Face Recognition Technology-Big Brother Arrives, supra note 17, at A15
(noting "high-tech surveillance by the [British] government is much more accepted than in the United States"); Julia Scheeres, Some Camera to Watch over You,
WIRED NEWS (Apr. 5, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42794,

00.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (noting Britain is "the world leader in video
surveillance use").
68. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, supra note 17, at
A15 (discussing use of system in England); Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (noting
cameras have been responsible for less than ten arrests); Ellis, supra note 3, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,38775,00.html (noting system's pres-

ence in Newham, England).
69. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, supra note 17, at
A15 (discussing England's use of face recognition technology); Ellis, supra note 3,

at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,38775,00.html (noting over 200
cameras search for known criminals on Newham's streets); Scheeres, supra note
67, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42794,00.html (noting in England "the unblinking eyes of security cameras are as much a part of the landscape
as Big Ben").
70. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc.co. uk/hi/english/sci/
tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (finding forty percent drop in crime); Ellis,
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the new technology that they announced a plan in 2000 to expand its
use."' They expected to install almost two million cameras across the
72
country to aid law enforcement officials.
III.

HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC PLACES

Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of face recognition technology, the Court has decided a
number of other cases that provide guidance for analyzing the legality of
this new technology. 73 Since the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court has ad-

dressed issues concerning privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment
and self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 74 By examining the
Court's history in addressing and analyzing these issues, it is possible to
develop a legal framework in which to analyze the legality of face recogni-

tion

technology.

75

supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/ 0,1294,38775,00.html (observing decrease in criminal activity); Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother

Arrives, supra note 17, at A15 (noting "Newham officials say the system has significantly reduced crime"); Scheeres, supra note 67, at http://www. wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,42794,00.html (discussing beneficial effects of technology in England). Face recognition technology and surveillance in general have been in

wide use throughout England. See id. ("The British government is so enthralled
with the technology that it announced plans to increase the number of cameras in
England .... ").
71. See Face Recognition Technology is Next-Big Brother Arrives, su/na note 17, at
Al 5 (describing plans in Britain to expand use of surveillance cameras).
72. See id. (describing plans to expand camera usage).
73. For a further discussion of court cases providing a framework for the legal
analysis of face recognition technology, see infra notes 74-109 and accompanying
text.
74. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (addressing issues
regarding use of thermal imaging); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988) (discussing self-incrimination privilege); Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (determining constitutionality of arial observation when it is not of defendant's property
and is done without warrant); Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (discussing constitutionality of pen register); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (discussing
self-incrimination privilege); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussing constitutionality of disclosing voice exemplars in front of grand jury); Gilbert v.
Cal., 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (discussing defendant's right to have counsel present
when presented in line-up); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding
expectation of privacy when using phone booth); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (discussing defendant's right to have counsel present when placed in
line-up); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (discussing constitutionality of
blood test performed in order to determine whether defendant was driving while
intoxicated); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (same).
75. For a complete analysis of the legality of face recognition technology, see
infra notes 110-47 and accompanying text.
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A.

Privacy and the Fourth Amendment

The most important decision from the Court regarding privacy under
76
the Fourth Amendment was the 1967 decision of Katz v. United States. In
Katz, the Court acknowledged that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
77
The Court
translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy."'
held, however, that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect indi78
Most imvidual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion.
portantly, Katz established a two-pronged test to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment protects an activity from governmental intrusion: 1)
whether there is an actual expectation of privacy; and 2) whether that ex79
pectation is one which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.
Since Katz, the Court has consistently upheld the notion that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists for things that a person exposes to the
public. 80 This notion is increasingly important when considering the dra76. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). This case came before the Supreme Court after the
defendant was convicted of placing a wager over the telephone from Los Angeles
to Miami and Boston. See id. at 348 (detailing facts of case). These wagers were
placed from a telephone booth and FBI agents used an electronic listening device
to record the petitioner's conversations. See id. at 348-49 (explaining events leading up to case). The petitioner contended that these conversations were recorded
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, however the court of appeals disagreed.
See id. (noting lower court's decision). The Supreme Court heard the case to decide whether a public phone booth was a constitutionally protected area and
whether a physical invasion into a constitutionally protected area was required in
order to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 353-54 (listing issues of case).
77. See id. at 350 (discussing that Fourth Amendment protections go further
than privacy and "often have nothing to do with privacy at all"). The Court noted
that personal privacy is protected from government intrusion by a number of provisions in the Constitution. See id. at 350-51 (analyzing purpose of Fourth Amendment). Despite the protections offered by the Constitution, "the protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like
the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States." Id.
78. See id. at 350 (recognizing protections provided by Fourth Amendment).
The Fourth Amendment states "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
shall not be violated ....
79. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing two-pronged test).
80. See, e.g., Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (delineating holding of
case); Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979) (same). In Smith, the Court addressed the issue of whether the use of a pen register by police amounted to a
Fourth Amendment search. See id. at 736 (noting issue of case). The police suspected Smith in a robbery and had the telephone company place a pen register on
his telephone to record the numbers he dialed from his home. See id. at 737 (discussing facts surrounding case). Although the police did not obtain a warrant for
the pen register, the information they obtained from it was later used to obtain a
warrant for Smith's home. See id. (describing evidence in question). Smith was
later arrested and at his trial, he sought to exclude all evidence obtained from the
use of the pen register under the theory that its use constituted a search without a
warrant, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment. See id. (outlining defendant's
argument). The Court rejected this argument, holding that individuals have no
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matic technological innovations that allow the government to use an individual's personal characteristics to identify him or her."1
One of the main cases addressing the use of personal characteristics,
and closely related to the issue of face recognition technology, is United
States v. Dionisio.8 2 The issue in Dionisiowas whether an individual's voice
reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. See id. at
742 (holding no privacy in telephone numbers dialed). In its holding, the Court
acknowledged that "[t]his Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Id. at 743-44.
In Ciraolo,the Court addressed the idea of whether the warrantless aerial viewing of an individual's fenced-in backyard constitutes an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 (noting issue in case). In this
case, the police had received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. See id. (detailing facts of case). The police were unable to
see over the fence surrounding the yard, so they used a private plane to fly over
Ciraolo's home and backyard. See id. (outlining method used to detect marijuana). During the flight, the police were able to identify marijuana, which they
photographed using a standard camera. See id. (describing how drugs were discovered). A warrant was subsequently issued, the marijuana plants were seized and
Ciraolo was arrested. See id. at 209-10 (discussing facts of case). At trial, Ciraolo
moved to have the evidence excluded, claiming that it was obtained subsequent to
a warrantless search of his backyard violating the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
210 (noting defendant's argument). The Court, on appeal, did not agree with this
reasoning and held that an aerial search of an individual's backyard was not a
Fourth Amendment search. See id. at 215 (holding Fourth Amendment was not
violated). Again, the Court upheld the idea that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect that which is "visible to the naked eye." Id. at 215.
81. For a further discussion of the impact of the decision in Katz on technological innovations used by the government to observe individuals, see infra notes
114-26 and accompanying text.
82. 410 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court heard this case in order to decide whether
the use of voice exemplars was a search tinder the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 3
(noting issue in case). In this case, a grand jury was convened to investigate a
possible violation of federal gambling laws. See id. at 2 (reciting facts of case).
During the grand jury investigation, a number of voice recordings were entered
into evidence. See id. (discussing evidence in question). To identify the voices on
the recordings, the grand jury issued subpoenas to approximately twenty individuals, to obtain voice exemplars. See id. at 3 (describing method by which evidence
was gathered). Each individual was requested to read a sample of the conversation
already entered into evidence and this reading was then recorded. See id. (noting
request for voice samples). These voice samples were then compared with the
recording already in evidence, in order to discover a match. See id. (setting forth
role evidence would play in case). Dionisio refused to furnish the grand jury with
the voice sample, claiming it violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. See
id. (explaining defendant's argument over evidence's constitutionality).
In Dionisio, the defendant also raised the issue of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 5 (noting issue raised in case). The Court
held that it was a long-standing principle that "the compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination." Id. at 5-6. For a complete discussion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
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could be used to identify him. 83 The Court held that because the Fourth
Amendment does not protect what "'a person knowingly exposes to the
84
public,"' there is no right to privacy in an individual's voice.
The Court in Dionisio also acknowledged that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his own face, as it is constantly exposed to the public. 85 In Davis v. Mississippi, 8 6 the Court expanded this
idea by noting that fingerprinting also does not constitute an invasion of
privacy because it "involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search."8 7 The
Court reasoned that because fingerprinting, like voice identification, does
not require any intrusiveness or penetration "beyond the body's surface,"
it does not implicate the dignity or privacy of an individual at a level that
would give rise to Fourth Amendment protection. 88 These cases solidify
the Court's jurisprudence that forms of surveillance or identification that
rely on an individual's characteristics that are constantly exposed to the
public including one's voice, fingerprints and facial characteristics, are not
protected under the Fourth Amendment. 8 9
The last word from the Supreme Court on the issue of privacy was in
2001.90 According to the Court in Kyllo v. United States,9 1 the use of a
thermal imaging device to scan a home was considered a search and, absent a valid search warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. 92 Despite
83. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 3 (summarizing facts of case). For a complete
discussion of the facts of Dionisio, see supra note 82.
84. See id. at 14 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
85. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 ("No person can have a reasonable expectation
that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.").
86. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
87. Id. at 727.
88. See id. (setting limits of Fourth Amendment protection, as well as what
constitutes Fourth Amendment search).
89. See generally Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 1 (defining limits of Fourth Amendment
protection); see also generally Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (same); Smith v.
Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (same); Davis, 394 U.S. at 721 (same); Katz v. United
States, 386 U.S. 347 (1967) (same).
90. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (analyzing
Fourth Amendment issues related to use of thermal imaging device).
91. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
92. See id. at 34 ("To withdraw protection of this minimum [privacy] expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment."). In 1991, petitioner was suspected of growing marijuana in
his home. See id. at 29-30 (outlining facts giving rise to case). To grow marijuana
inside the home, an individual needs high power lamps. See id. (noting technology
required to grow marijuana). To detect the presence of these lamps, two agents
from the Department of the Interior used thermal imaging devices to scan Kyllo's
home and the other homes in his complex. See id. (detailing method used by
police to search individual's home). The imaging devices are designed to detect
infrared radiation, emitted by almost all objects, but not visible to the naked eye.
See id. (summarizing method used by thermal imagers). The imagers are also able
to indicate the heat generated by the objects by dividing the radiation emitted into
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the limits this holding seems to place on the use of forms of electronic
surveillance, Kyllo only protects individuals when they are inside their
homes, and offers citizens no protection when they are in public, thereby
retaining the notion that individual privacy is unprotected when an indi93
vidual willingly exposes something to the public.
B.

Self-incimination and the Fifth Amendment

The Supreme Court established the parameters of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the 1966 decision of Schmerber
v. California.9 4 In Schmerber, the Court limited the Fifth Amendment protections to certain types of information.9 5 The Court held that the Fifth
categories: black is cool, white is hot and gray falls somewhere between the two.
See id. (noting capabilities of imagers). The scan of the homes was conducted by
the agents in a car across from the house and revealed that certain parts of the
Kyllo's house were significantly hotter when compared to other parts of the house
and the other houses in the complex. See id. (summarizing facts of case). Using
this information, combined with informant tips and Kyllo's utility bills, a search
warrant was issued for Kyllo's home. See id. (discussing how warrant was obtained).
The search revealed that Kyllo was in fact using high-powered halide light to grow
marijuana inside and he was subsequently arrested. See id. (detailing results of
search). Kyllo sought to suppress the evidence on the theory that the use of the
thermal imager was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. See
id. (outlining defendant's argument).
93. See id. at 34 (applying Katz test). "We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' . . . constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use." Id.
94. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The Court heard this case in order to determine
whether an individual who had a blood sample taken for a blood alcohol test was
forced to be a witness against himself, violating the Fifth Amendment. See id. at
759 (questioning legality of blood alcohol test). Schmerber had been in a car
accident and was taken to the hospital for the treatment of his injuries. See id. at
758 (outlining facts in case). While at the hospital, Schmerber was arrested by
police for driving under the influence. See id. (describing events leading up to
case). At the hospital, police directed a doctor to draw a sample of blood from
Schmerber. See id. (examining method by which sample was obtained). Tests on
the blood sample indicated that Schmerber's blood alcohol level was over the legal
limit at the time of the accident. See id. at 759 (discussing results of blood test).
Schmerber's blood alcohol level was entered into evidence at his trial. See id. (outlining use of blood alcohol level at trial). He objected to its admittance, claiming
that the blood sample was drawn despite his refusal and it amounted to a violation
of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. (noting defendant's objections). The Court did not support this reasoning, holding that the
evidence did not fall into the scope of evidence protected under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 764 (analyzing scope of Fifth Amendment).
95. See id. ("[Fifth Amendment] offers no protection against compulsion to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing .... ). The Court held, more specifically, that "the privilege [against self-incrimination] is a bar against compelling
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or
accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." Id.
In this statement, the Court held that where the individual himself is the evidence, either in his face, features or even his own blood, the use of that informa-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/6

18

Mallon: Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make, I'll Be Watching You:

20031

COMMENT

Amendment protects an individual from being forced to provide the government with "evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. ' 96 The
Court stated that fingerprints, photographs, voice and stance are not protected as evidence that is testimonial or communicative in nature. 97 Furthermore, the Court has consistently held that compelling evidence
including a blood test, which goes beyond the body's surface, is not considered testimonial or communicative and is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 98
In Gilbert v. State of California,99 the Court stretched this reasoning to
cover an individual's handwriting in holding that "[a] mere handwriting
exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or
body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside [the Fifth
Amendment's] protection." 10 0 The Court again extended this reasoning
tion as evidence does not rise to the level of being testimonial or communicative in
nature and is therefore not protected under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 76164 (discussing limits of Fifth Amendment).
96. See id. at 761. The Fifth Amendment states that no "person be compelled,
in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Schmerber, the
Court examined the policies surrounding the Fifth Amendment and firmly established the parameters of what evidence it protects. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762
(analyzing purpose of Fifth Amendment).
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state or
federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to shoulder the entire load," . . . to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
Id. (citing Miranda v. Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)). The Court acknowledged
that "[i]t is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which
are also communications .. " Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64. In this case, however,
the drawing of Schmerber's blood did not amount to a communication and was
not protected under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 761 (holding blood test did
not violate Fifth Amendment).
97. See id. at 764 (holding Fifth Amendment offers no protection against compulsion to submit to "fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or
speak for identification").
98. See generally id. (defining limits of Fifth Amendment protection); see also
generally Gilbert v. Cal., 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (same); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1957) (same).
99. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
100. See id. at 266-67. In its holding, the Court acknowledged that an individual's handwriting is in fact a means of communication, however not every communication is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 266 (setting limits on Fifth
Amendment protection). The Court noted that the content of handwritten communications can rise to the level of a communication that is protected under the
Fifth Amendment, however handwriting itself offered no such protection. See id. at
267 (finding that handwriting is not protected because it is "an identifying physical
characteristic").
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in United States v. Wade,"" when it held that compelling an individual to
submit to a lineup does not amount to self-incrimination and is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. 10 2 In Wade, the Court reasoned that be-

cause the accused is merely required to show his face and not required to
divulge any information he might possess in a line-up, there is no protec03
tion under the Fifth Amendment.
In 1988, the Court solidified its jurisprudence regarding the Fifth
Amendment in Doe v. United States,10 4 when it held that "in order to be
testimonial, an accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 'witness' against himself."10 5 Once again, the Court
upheld the notion that the privilege against self-incrimination only comes
into play when the government compels an individual to give some kind of
10 6
testimonial communication.
Despite the fact that the legality of face recognition technology remains untested in the court system, the history of Supreme Court decisions regarding privacy and self-incrimination, makes it possible to
examine how the Court would react to Constitutional challenges to this
new technology. 10 7 Applying the rules that the Court has laid out in its
previous cases, it is clear that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect
governmental use of face recognition technology. 108 In the hands of private
101. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
102. See id. at 222 (holding that forcing individual to take part in lineup does
not involve compulsion to give evidence that is testimonial in nature).
103. See id. (noting lineup involves "compulsion of the accused to exhibit his
physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge").
104. 487 U.S. 201 (1988). John Doe was the suspect of "possible federal offenses arising from suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt
of unreported income." Id. at 202. Doe had to appear before a grand jury and
they subpoenaed records of his bank accounts. See id. (discussing facts of case).
While Doe produced some of the requested documents, he denied the possession
of others, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at
202-03 (outlining defendant's argument). The grand jury also subpoenaed the
records of three foreign banks with whom Doe did business. See id. at 203 (noting
initial inability to obtain documents). The banks refused to turn the records over,
citing their privacy policies, which do not allow them to turn over records without
the customer's consent. See id. (discussing privacy policies of banks). The government subsequently filed a motion with the district court, asking for a court order
forcing Doe to sign consent forms to allow the banks to turn over his records. See
id. (summarizing facts of case). The court refused to grant the motion and the
case eventually came before the Supreme Court to decide whether a court order
forcing an individual to authorize his bank to turn over financial statements violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 206 (examining lower court decision).
105. Id. at 210.
106. See id. (citing Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (defining boundaries of privilege against self-incrimination)).
107. For a further discussion of the legality of face recognition technology,
see infra notes 110-47 and accompanying text.
108. For a further discussion of the legality of face recognition technology in
the hands of the government, see infra notes 113-37 and accompanying text.
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citizens, however, the use of this technology continues to raise a number
of questions. 10 9
IV.

PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

The events at the 2001 Super Bowl, coupled with the fact that this new
technology and the legal issues raised remain untested in a courtroom,
have lead to an onslaught of individuals questioning the privacy implications that arise from the use of face recognition software. 110 This technology is used in two main areas: by the government and by private

individuals.1 11 For government use of face recognition, the applicable
1
limitations are located in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

12

109. For a further discussion of the legality of the use of face recognition
technology in the hands of third parties, see infra notes 138-47 and accompanying
text.
110. See generallyJOHN D. WOODWARD, JR., SUPER BOWL SURVEILLANCE: FACING

UP TO BIOMETRICS 7-8 (Rand Arroyo Center May 2001) (discussing issues raised by
face recognition technology); Kathryn Balint, Who Are You? Technology Plays Key Role
in New Efforts to Verify Identity, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 25, 2001, at Computer
Link 6; Grayson Barber, Public Video Surveillance Erodes Our Integrity, 165 N.J. L.J. 427
(same); Barbara Rose, High-Tech Security on Stage; Events of Sept. 11 Put ID Devices in
the Spotlight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2001, at Business 1 (same); Harvey A. Silverglate,
Who Gets to Do the Taping?, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 20, 2001, at A25 (same); Digital Big
Brother,supra note 4, at C18 (same); CNN Live This Morning: America's New War: Look
at Some Security Measures that Could be Put into Place (CNN television broadcast, Oct.
1, 2001) (transcript on file with author) (same); Today: Security Camerason the Rise;
Charles Shoebridge, Scotland Yard, Comments on Camera-Film Evidence to Catch
Criminals; Privacy Concerns of Other Surveillance Systems (NBC television broadcast,
Sept. 27, 2001) (transcript on file with author) (same); Biometrics and Privacy: Industry Policy on Crowd Surveillance, Int'l Biometric Indus. Ass'n (Feb. 2, 2001), available
at http://www.ibia.org/pressrelease19.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001) (same);
Heather Green, Technology's Creeping Threats to Privacy, Bus. WK. ONLINE (Aug. 13,
2001), at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2001 /tc
20010813_691.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001) (same); Thomas C. Greene, Think
Tank Urges Face-Scanningof the Masses, Register (Aug. 13, 2001), at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/20966.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) (same); Nuger,
supra note 5, at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_consideration.
html (same); Paul O'Shea, Watching the Watchers, ChipCenter at http://www.
chipcenter.com/analog/ed002.htm?PRINT=true
(last visited Sept. 3, 2002)
(same); Andy Sullivan, Security Firms Call for Video-Surveillance Law, Yahoo! News
(Aug. 8, 2001), at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010808/tc/tech_privacy-surveillance dc_1.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2002) (same); Dr. George
Tomko, Biometrics as a Privacy-enhancing Technology: Friend or Foe of Privacy?, Privacy
Laws & Bus. 9th Privacy Commissioners'/Data Protection Authorities Workshop
(Sept. 15, 1998), availableat http://www.dss.state.ct.us/digital/tomko.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (same).
111. For a further discussion of the government's use of face recognition
technology, see infra notes 113-37 and accompanying text. For a further discussion
of private individual's use of face recognition technology, see infra notes 13847
and accompanying text.
112. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/columns/
COL_20010718.html ("Cast strictly in terms of constitutional law, the legal case
against video surveillance and face recognition technology rests on the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, which protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and
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Governmental Use of Biometrics

The Fourth Amendment

One of the main concerns with face recognition technology is that
using surveillance cameras amounts to a search and is therefore subject to
the restraints of the Fourth Amendment.' 13 The Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to people and not to places.'1 4 More
specifically, to determine whether government use of face recognition
technology violates the Fourth Amendment, courts should apply the Katz
two-prong test.' 15 The first question is whether an individual has an actual
expectation of privacy. 116 In considering this issue, it should be emphasized that the Court has consistently held that an individual has no valid
expectation of privacy in something he or she willingly exposes to the public. 117 By choosing to walk the streets, attend a sporting event or go to the
store, an individual is choosing to expose his or her likeness to the public
and anything he or she may encounter on the streets, including surveillance cameras. 18 The Court has acknowledged that
self-incrimination."); Nuger, supra note 5, at http://www. engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_consideration.html (analyzing face recognition technology in
terms of Fourth and Fifth Amendments); O'Shea, supra note 110, at http://
www.chipcenter.com/analog/ed002.htm (noting Fourth and Fifth Amendments
form basis of analysis of face recognition technology).
113. See McCullagh, supra note 46, at http://www.wired. corn/news/print/
0,1294,41571,00.html (quoting American Civil Liberties Union concern that face
recognition technology "raises serious concerns about the Fourth Amendment
right of all citizens to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures").
114. See William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1265, 1266 (1999) (noting "[p]rivacy, in Fourth Amendment terms,
is something that exists only in certain types of spaces").
115. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (establishing twoprong test for Fourth Amendment protection). In Katz, Justice Harlan articulated
the two-pronged test that applies in cases concerning an invasion of Fourth
Amendment privacy. See id. (setting forth test). "My understanding of the Rile
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id.
116. See id. (discussing prongs of test). In Katz, the issue was whether an individual has an actual expectation of privacy in his or her personal characteristics
when he or she is walking down the street or is present inside a store or business.
See id. at 361-62 (clarifying two-pronged test applicable to Fourth Amendment
issues).
117. See id. at 353 (holding that government action of listening to conversation in phone booth violated Fourth Amendment); see also Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986) (deciding that police observation of yard from airplane does not
violate Fourth Amendment); Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that
Fourth Amendment not violated when police use pen register to record phone
number dialed); Davis v. Miss., 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (finding that fingerprinting does not violate Fourth Amendment).
118. See Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at C18 ("According to law, a person
has no expectation of privacy when he or she chooses to be in a public place.");
McCullagh, supra note 46, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41571,00.
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[t]he physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and
manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are
constantly exposed to the public. Like a man'sfacial characteristics,

or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to
hear. No person can have a reasonable expectation that others
will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a myste7y to the world.1 19

Because an individual regularly exposes his or her face to the world, there
120
is no Fourth Amendment violation when that face is photographed.
Even if a court would find that individuals do possess actual expectations of privacy when they are out in public, Katz also requires that the
expectation be one that society is willing to recognize as being reasonable. 12 1 This determination involves balancing society's desire to protect
the public safety against individual privacy. The increasing desire to protect public safety, however, would likely overshadow any personal privacy
interest that individuals may have when they are in public. 1 22 Most Americans are not, and may never be, ready to accept that an individual can
expect to maintain his or her privacy when he or she is in public. Without
society's willingness to protect an individual's privacy in his or her countehtml ("'There's no Fourth Amendment problem if the government is simply observing-or even recording what goes on in public ....');O'Shea, supra note 110,
at http://www.chipcenter.com/analog/ed002.htm ("[A] person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to physical characteristics that are
constantly exposed to the public .... ).
119. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (emphasis added). The
Court did uphold a narrow exception to this rule, as offered by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
Except for the rare recluse who chooses to live his life in complete solitude, in our daily lives we constantly speak and write, and while the content of a communication is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection ...
the underlying identifying characteristics-the constant factor throughout both public and private communications-are open for all to see or
hear.
Id. In upholding the Second Circuit's statement, the Supreme Court held that
while characteristics an individual regularly exposes to the public are not protected under the Fourth Amendment, there is a small exception for individuals
who have chosen to live their lives without public contact.
See id. (establishing small exception to rule that facial characteristics are not
protected tinder Fifth Amendment).
120. See McCullagh, supra note 46, at http://www. wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,41571,00.html (observing "there's no legitimate expectation of privacy");
O'Shea, supra note 110, at http://www.chipcenter.com/ analog/ed002.htm
("[L]aw enforcement's use of the technique at the Super Bowl does not appear to
run afoul of the protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution.").
121. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (laying out requirements of test). The
second prong of the Katz test involves examining the reasonableness of an expectation that an individual can maintain his or her privacy while in public. See id.
(articulating reasonableness prong of test).
122. See id. (noting requirements of second prong of test).
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nance when he or she is in public, it cannot be protected by the Fourth
123
Amendment.
Because face recognition technology does not meet the test established by the Court in Katz, it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 12 4 If the use of face recognition systems are not considered
searches, the government can use the technology in public places without
violating individual privacy rights.' 2 5 Although it appears that the use of
face recognition technology would likely be protected under the Fourth
Amendment, we cannot be sure of the outcome until the issue is resolved
by a court. 126 As technology continues to advance, courts are forced to
address the problems that arise from these new advances.' 27 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyllo v. United States'2 8 recognized the
Court's willingness to make room in the law for technological innovations. 12 9 The decision in Kyllo, however, is also important because it recognizes the Court's willingness to limit the use of certain types of
electronic surveillance devices.' 30 While the Court did limit its holding to
the privacy of the home, Kyllo presents the possibility that in the future the
31
Court could extend this privacy protection to public places.'
2.

The Fifth Amendment

Another concern with face recognition technology is that by using an
individual's face to identify him or her, an individual is forced to be a
123. See Fiona Harvey, Technology that Stands Outfrom the Crowd: Biometric SecurTIMES (LONDON), Sept. 25, 2001, at 14 (discussing heightened need
for security); Rose, supra note 110, at Business 1 (reporting on "a nation that increasingly will turn for protection to high-tech devices").
124. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (laying out test). If an event or action does not
meet the two prongs of the test set forth by Justice Harlan, it is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment. See id. (noting certain events that do not meet test and
are not protected by Fourth Amendment).
125. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 7 (analyzing technology in terms of
Fourth Amendment).
126. See O'Shea, supra note 110, at http://www.chipcenter.com/ analog/
ed002.htm ("[L]aw enforcement's use ... does not appear to run afoul of the
protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution.").
127. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (deciding issue
regarding use of thermal imaging device).
128. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
129. See id. at 33-34 (addressing use of thermal imager).
130. See id. (limiting police use of thermal imagers). In its decision, the Court
addressed the fact that changes in technology have an effect on an individual's
privacy rights. See id. (addressing effect of technology). The Court noted "[i]t
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."
Id. The Court further recognized "[t] he question we confront today is what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." Id.
131. See id. (leaving open issue of use of technology in public).

ity Systens, FIN.
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13 2
witness against him or herself, thereby violating the Fifth Amendment.
This is an issue the Court has addressed a number of times, continually
holding that an individual's personal characteristics do not fall within the
types of communications that are protected under the Fifth Amendment. 133 The Court has held that only evidence that is "testimonial or
communicative in nature" falls within the umbrella of protection offered
by the Fifth Amendment. 13 4 An individual's face is simply an identifying
physical characteristic and is not considered a piece of evidence that contains any type of testimony or communication. 135 Just as an individual's
forced participation in a line-up is not considered testimonial or communicative, it should follow that a photograph taken of an individual who is
136
willingly in public is also not testimonial or communicative in nature.
Thus, individuals should not be considered witnesses against themselves
137
when their photographs are taken as part of a face recognition system.

B.

Third-Party Use of Biometrics

The true privacy problems arise from third-party use of face recognition technology.'13 8 The biggest concern stemming from third party use is
132. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/clumns/
COL_20010718.html ("Cast strictly in terms of constitutional law, the legal case
against video surveillance and face recognition technology rests on the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment ....");Nuger, supra note 5, at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/ publications consideration.html (analyzing face recognition technology
in terms of Fifth Amendment); O'Shea, supra note 110, at http://
www.chipcenter.com/analog/ed002.htm (noting Fifth Amendment serves as one
basis for analysis of face recognition technology).
133. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 219 (1988) (holding that compelling individual to turn over bank records does not violate Fifth Amendment); Gilbert v. Cal., 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (deciding that requiring handwriting samples
does not violate Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221
(1967) (holding that requiring individual to take part in line-up does not violate
Fifth Amendment); Schmerber v. Cal., 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (finding that Fifth
Amendment was not violated when suspect's blood was drawn).
134. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (establishing parameters of Fifth Amendment protections).
135. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67 (examining what means of communication
are protected by Fifth Amendment). Because an individual's face does not in itself
contain any type of testimony or communication, it is not considered the type of
evidence that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 266 ("The [Fifth
Amendment]
privilege
reaches only compulsion
of 'an accused's
communications' .... ).
136. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 222 ("We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation ... involves no compulsion of
the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance.").
137. See id. (holding there is no violation of Fifth Amendment when individual is required to show his or her face).
138. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com/introduction.html (discussing privacy concerns of biometric technology). "[T]he
threat to privacy arises not from the positive identification that biometrics provide,
but the ability of third parties to access this in identifiable form and link it to other
information, resulting in secondary uses of that information without the consent
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the potential for private citizens to develop and maintain vast amounts of
information on individuals. 13 9 With the new technology being made available to the public, there is the possibility that businesses across the country
will install surveillance cameras to scan the faces of their customers and
employees. 140 There is also a fear that businesses will begin to develop
data files on their customers and employees, and then share these files
with other businesses. 14 1 The result is that businesses could track customer purchases or the whereabouts of their employees and every time
142
individuals enter a store, their faces can call up their entire data file.
Personal information is meant to remain private. Thus, the fact that
technology is giving private individuals the power to recall personal information with a simple photograph raises concerns over the need to regulate this new technology. 143 While the Constitution may place limits on
the government's use of this technology, there is no equivalent that regulates its use by private citizens. 144 Currently, there are no state or federal
of the data subject." Id.; see also

JEFFREY ROSEN, T1HE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DE-

3 (2000) (commenting on erosion of privacy in
America). Rosen comments that "the erosion of privacy, at home, at work, and in
cyberspace, so that intimate personal information-from diaries, e-mail, and computer files to records of the books we read and the Web sites we browse-is increasingly vulnerable to being wrenched out of control and exposed to the world." Id.
139. See Green, supra note 110, at http://www.business week.com/technology/content/aug2001/tc200l0813_691.htm (questioning "[w]hat's to stop commercial companies from acquiring these public records and selling them").
140. See Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/studentpapers/fa1199-papers/prevost-biometrics.htm (discussing dangers of biometrics).
141. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 7 ("As technology advances, however,
particularly to the point that many . . . databases become interlinked, then the
threat to information privacy has the potential to increase significantly.").
The biggest danger of biometrics, according to privacy advocates, is that
biometric identifiers can be linked to databases of other information that
people do not want dispersed. The threat to privacy arises from 'the ability of third parties to access this data in identifiable form and link it to
other information, resulting in secondary uses of the information, without the consent of the data subject.'
Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/student-papers/fa199papers/prevost-biometrics.htm.
142. See Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/studentpapers/fa1199-papers/prevost-biometrics.htm. (noting potential dangers of face
recognition technology). A number of hypotheticals involving the possible use of
face recognition technology have been discussed. See Weinstein, supra note 44, at
128 (noting potential abuses of technology). There is a fear that in the case of
divorce, attorneys will be able to obtain information about the exact whereabouts
of spouses accused of cheating. See id. (discussing extreme uses of technology).
Many are also concerned that insurance companies will begin using the technology to track their customers and discover whether they have been taking part in
potentially risky activities. See id. (posing potential problems from technology).
143. See Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at C18 (noting privacy problems);
Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com/introduction.html (discussing use of technology in hands of third parties).
144. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/columns/
COL_20010718.html (noting, Constitution limits only government use); McCulSTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
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laws that regulate the use of face recognition technology and laws that do
control the use of an individual's private information are ill-equipped to
handle this new and changing technology.1'4 5 Without restriction, there is
the potential for private use of face recognition technology to cross the
boundary from providing security to invading privacy. 146 As it stands now,
the use of face recognition technology does not violate the protection afremains an unlimited
forded by the Constitution. Nevertheless, there still
147
amount of danger that this technology can pose.

V.

THE FUTURE OF FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND

ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

A.

Expanding the Use of Face Recognition Technology

Because of its use at the 2001 Super Bowl, Americans have become
more aware of face recognition technology.1 48 Since the Super Bowl,14a9
number of cities and businesses began researching the new technology.
lagh, supra note 46, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41571,00.html
(observing Constitution only restricts actions of government, not private firms);
Nuger, supra note 5, at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publicationsconsideration.html (observing "[i]n the private sector, individuals will have
fewer protections than in the public sector").
145. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/columns/
COL_20010718.html ("There are no federal or state laws that limit the scope of
face recognition or video surveillance that criminally punish those that violate the
law or that create enforceable civil remedies for the victims of abuse.").
146. See O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al ("'America now faces a choice about

how far we want to go down the road to being a surveillance society,' said Jeffrey
Rosen, a law professor at George Washington Univerty and author of a book on
privacy."); Slevin, supra note 4, at Al ("'We are quickly moving to the point where
law enforcement and the private sector will be able to identify us no matter where
we go, no matter how anonymous we think we are .... ').
147. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 6 ("[L]aw enforcement's use of the
technique at the Super Bowl does not appear to run afoul of the protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution."); McCullagh, supra note 46, at http://
www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294, 41571,00.html ("Andrew Grosso, a former
federal prosecutor, concedes that under traditional privacy law, the practice may
be legal-but predicts courts will change their minds if Americans begin to object
O'Shea, supra note 110, at http://
to automated sureveillance.");
www.chipcenter.com/analog/ed002?PRINT=true (declaring that face recognition
technology would be considered constitutional).
148. See Huhn, supra note 4, at 51 ("Its [face recognition technology] first
presence on the worldwide stage kicked off in Tampa, Fla., in January this year at
Super Bowl XXXV."); Scheeres, supra note 42, at http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,45687,00.html (noting "technology first gained public notoriety" at
Super Bowl); Scheeres, supra note 3, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,42317,00.html (observing face recognition technology "lept into the public's consciousness Super Bowl Sunday").
149. See generally Balint, supra note 110, at Computer Link 6 (discussing emergence of face recognition technology); Kip Bauersfeld, A Face in the Crowd, PRAGUE
PosT, Oct. 1, 2001, at eworld (same); Fiona Harvey, Government Authorities Have Got
Your Number: Surveillance Part One, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 2, 2001, at 13 (same);
Harvey, supra note 123, at 14 (same); Gaetan Lecointe, Face-recognition Software
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Additionally, a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, airports and cities across the country are looking to use the new technology
to regain a level of safety and security that seems to have been lost.1 5 0 As a

result, the biometric industry, as a whole, has experienced unprecedented
15 1
growth over the past few years.
Although the United States and England may lead the way in the use
of face recognition technology, other countries are beginning to institute
this new technology in an effort to increase security and protect their citizens. 15 2 While airports in the United States are just discovering the posGains New PopularityAfter US Attacks, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 3, 2001; Steven
Levy, Technology: A High-Tech Home Front,NEWSWK., Oct. 8, 2001, at 43 (same); Rose,
supra note 110, at Business I (same); CNBC: Visionics Chairman and CEO-Interview
(CNBC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 2001) (transcript on file with author)
(same); CNN Live This Morning, supra note 110 (same); CNN: The Point with Greta
Van Susteren (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 24, 2001) (transcript on file with
author) (same); CNN Talkback Live (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 24, 2001)
(transcript on file with author) (same); Today, supra note 110 (same).
Even before the events of September 11, there were a number of airports
across the country that already made use of biometric technology, primarily for the
purpose of identifying their employees. See After the Terrorist Attacks: What Could
Biometrics Have Done? What Might They Do in the Future?, Biometric Group, at http:/
/www.biometricgroup.com/e/ Brief.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (reporting on
previous use of technology). At eight airports across the United States and Canada, hand scans are used to allow citizens to circumvent the lines at immigration.
See id. (listing use by airports). San Francisco International Airport also utilizes
hand scans to provide employee access in the airport. See id. (delineating airports
employing hand scans). At O'Hare Airport in Chicago, employee access to the
cargo area is regulated by the use of finger scans. See id. (reporting on biometric
technology use prior to events of September 11, 2001). Charlotte/Douglas Airport
in North Carolina utilizes iris scans to regulate employee access to their cargo area.
See id. (noting use of iris scans). Reagan National Airport in Washington, D.C.
even uses fingerprint scans during employees' pre-employment background
checks. See id. (listing airports using fingerprint scans).
150. As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the U.S. government
formed a number of Rapid Response Teams, one of which was designed to study
airport security. See Mary Kirby, Smart Card Technology on Rapid Response Team Lists,
AIR TRANsp. INTELLIGENCE, Sept. 24, 2001, at 1 (noting formation of Rapid Response Teams). The team is considering using Washington National or Boston's
Logan Airport as a test case for the use of face recognition technology in an airport setting. See id. (reporting on suggestions of team).
151. See Balint, supra note 110, at Computer Link 6 (disclosing use of biometrics as method for identifying enemies).
152. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news.bbc. co.uk/hi/english/sci/
tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (detailing use of face recognition technology); O'Harrow, supra note 3, at Al (illustrating use of technology). The use of
face recognition technology is not limited to the uses described in this Comment.
See Biometrics Introduction,supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com (listing uses of
biometrics). Throughout the United States and the rest of the world, governments
and private citizens are beginning to capitalize on the security benefits they believe
face recognition and biometric technology can provide. See id. (noting growth in
use of technology).
Outside the United States, the use of face recognition technology is growing
just as fast: Mexico is adapting face recognition technology to reduce voter fraud;
Tokyo's subway system is equipped with a face recognition system; Germany is in-
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sibilities provided by the new technology, Iceland's Keflavik International
Airport has already implemented it. 153 As more countries discover the
potential benefits of face recognition technology, it will likely continue to
54
grow along with other forms of electronic surveillancei
B.

Expanding Electronic Surveillance

The increasing popularity of face recognition technology coincides
with an increase in use of other forms of biometric and electronic surveillance.' 55 Recently, public safety concerns have led the government to installing face recognition systems at its ATM machines; and China is using face recognition technology to allow illiterate peasants to set up bank accounts. See id.
(listing uses of face recognition technology outside United States); Sullivan, supra
note 110, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010808/tc/tech-privacy-surveillance dcj1.html (exploring use in China).
153. See CNN Live This Morning,supra note 110 (discussing use of technology
by Iceland).
154. See Balint, supra note 110, at Computer Link 6 (noting probable rise in
revenue due to increasing popularity of biometrics); Veronica Henry, Biometrics:
Face Recognition Technology, SANS Inst. (Mar. 12, 2001), at http://www.sans.org/
infosecFAQ/authentic/ face_rec.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (showing rise in
revenue generated by biometric technology); Emelie Rutherford, Face Time, DARWIN ONLINE (July 13, 2001), at http://www.darwinmag.com/read/machineshop/
column.html?ArticlelD=133 (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (predicting rise in biometric revenue reaching $520 million by 2006). Although the exact numbers may
differ, experts agree that the revenue generated by biometrics will rise dramatically
in the next few years. See Balint, supra note 110, at Computer Link 6 (reporting on
rise in revenue). In total, revenue generated from biometrics in 1999 was approximately sixty million dollars. See Henry, supra,at http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/
authentic/facerec.htm (predicting rise in revenue and analyzing revenue generated); Rutherford, supra, at http://www.darwinmag.com/read/machineshop/column.html?ArticlelD=13 (reporting on revenue). This number is expected to rise
to over five hundred million dollars in the next few years. See Henry, supra, at
http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/ authentic/face_rec.htm (predicting future
growth); Rutherford, supra, at http://www.darwinmag.com/read/ machineshop/
column.html?ArticlelD=13 (reporting on potential growth).
155. See Today, supra note 110 (observing "[w]e are rapidly becoming a surveillance society"); Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.
com (finding rise in surveillance). Although face recognition may currently be the
most talked about form of biometric technology, it is certainly not the only form
currently being used. See id. (describing other forms of biometric technology).
Throughout the world, countries are looking to implement systems designed to
increase security. See id. (reporting on foreign interest in biometrics). Fingerprint
recognition is being implemented in a number of countries: in Japan it is being
used to guard the entry to homes; customers at the Standard Bank of South Africa
are now able to withdraw money from ATMs using their fingerprints; Charles
Schwab is using fingerprint recognition to identify its employees; Walt Disney
World is implementing a plan allowing season pass holders to do away with photo
identification cards and instead use fingerprint identification. See id. (providing
examples of biometric technology uses). ATMs in Japan are currently being
equipped with iris recognition systems, while Chemical Bank is instituting a voice
recognition system designed to help identify their customers. See id. (discussing
foreign use of biometric technology). Even Mastercard and Visa are looking to
utilize biometric technology to increase the security of its credit cards and reduce
credit card fraud. See id. (illustrating uses of biometrics).
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stitute a variety of surveillance mechanisms that have evoked a public
backlash. 5 6 One of the most notable uses of surveillance is installing cam57
eras at stoplights that are designed to catch drivers who run red lights.'
Another major use of electronic surveillance by the government is
Carnivore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) new wiretapping
system.' 58 With a court order, the Carnivore system allows the FBI to
monitor an individual's Internet use, including e-mails and websites visited. 159 Carnivore has the capacity to scan millions of e-mails per second,
making it a powerful tool in the government's effort to monitor Internet
traffic. 160
Additionally, security and other concerns have motivated businesses
and individuals to expand their use of electronic surveillance.'"' Recently, a number of car rental companies began installing tracking devices
into their vehicles to monitor both their speed and location.' 6 2 In New
York City, taxi cab companies have installed surveillance cameras in a
number of taxi cabs in an effort to eliminate crimes committed against
drivers.' 6 3 These cameras record what occurs in cabs and in the event that
156. See Anderson, supra note 4, at http://news. bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/
tech/newsid_1500000/1500017.stm (noting protests from presence of cameras in
Tampa); Proposal Wants to Keep Big Brother's Eye Shut, News4Jax.com, at http://

www.news4jax.com/jax/news/stories/news-92779620010821-150801.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002) (reporting on proposal to make face recognition technology
illegal in response to unhappiness with its use in Tampa).
157. See Tim O'Leary, Red-light Scofflaws Targeted, PREss-ENTERRISE, Feb. 14,
2001, available at 112001 WL 9570130 (detailing use of cameras at traffic lights).
The cameras record the license numbers of drivers who run red lights and generate tickets that are sent to the driver. See id. (describing how cameras work).
158. SeeJohnny Gilman, Comment, Carnivore: The Uneasy Relationship Between
the Fourth Amendment and Electronic Surveillance of Internet Communications, 9 COMM.
L. CoNsIEci'us 111, 122-24 (2001) (discussing Carnivore system and privacy implications of its use).
159. See id. at 112 (stating FBI's ability to use Carnivore system to monitor email communication).
160. See id. (detailing capabilities of Carnivore system).
161. See Nakyanzi, supra note 54, at http://www.abcnews. go.com/sections/
scitech/DailyNews/surveilcams010703.html (exploring debate of public safety versus personal privacy, particularly in private sector); Rutherford, supra note 154, at
http://www.darwinmag.com/read/machineshop/column.html?ArticlelD=13
(explaining private sector's use of technology).
162. See Robert Lemos, Rental-car FirmExceeding the Privacy Limit?, CNET (June
20, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-268747.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2002) (discussing rental car companies' use of tracking). The use of this tracking
has caused quite a bit of controversy, and one driver who received a fine from his
rental car company for speeding has since brought suit. See id. (noting problems
stemming from use of tracking).
163. See Tom Jackman & Leef Smith, Taxi Camera Develops Its First Lead for
Police; Armed Robbery in Mount Vernon Caught in Digital Clarity, WASH. PosT, Aug. 22,
2001, at BI (detailing use of cameras in taxis in response to robberies). Since
June, 2001, the 107 taxi cabs operated by Springfield Yellow Cab in Northern Virginia have been equipped with small cameras mounted near the cars' rearview
mirrors. See id. (illustrating success of cameras in identifying criminals). The cameras are designed to cut down on the number of crimes committed against taxi cab
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a crime does occur, they provide evidence to assist in tracking down the
criminals.1 64 These are only a few examples of how the government and
private citizens are expanding the different forms of electronic surveil165
lance to monitor the actions of others.
C.

Regulating Electronic Surveillance

One of the most significant problems with the already existing face

recognition systems is the lack of laws or regulations setting guidelines for
their uses. 16 6 As discussed previously, while its use may be protected by
the Constitution, there still remains a need to regulate biometric technology. 167 Many people believe that the use of the technology may infringe
168
on individuals' privacy rights.
drivers, a major issue for the profession in the past few years. See id. (noting goal of
cameras). The cameras are designed to take photographs when the cab door is
opened, when the meter is activated and again at random intervals, as well as to
have the capability to take photos manually. See id. (discussing operation of surveillance cameras). Each camera stores up to 320 photographs, and they are reviewed
only if a crime has been committed. See id. (detailing capabilities of cameras).
The use of cameras in taxi cabs began in Houston, Texas in 1999 and cameras have
been installed in taxi cabs in Austin, Denver, Jacksonville, Minneapolis, San
Antonio and New York, as well as those in Northern Virginia. See id. (recognizing
expanding use of cameras in taxi cabs). With a rise in the number of crimes coinmitted against taxi cab drivers, some areas have required the presence of these
cameras, with Washington D.C. requiring all taxi cab drivers to have the cameras
installed in their cars. See id. (reporting on required presence of cameras).
164. See id. (describing capabilities of system). One example of the benefits
of these surveillance cameras is in the case of a taxi cab driver in Mount Vernon,
Virginia who was robbed while on duty. See id. (outlining facts of incident). Because the taxi cab was equipped with a surveillance camera, the police have been
able to produce clear, sharp pictures to aid in their search for a suspect. See id.
(noting ability of cameras to aid in search for suspect).
165. See id. (exploring use of cameras in taxi cabs); Lemos, supra note 162, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1040-268747.html (discussing use of tracking by
rental car companies).
166. See Ken Phillips, UnforgettableBiometrics, ZDNet (Oct. 26, 1997), at http://
www.zdnet.com/eweek/reviews/1027/27bioapp.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2002)
("The main challenges currently facing the biometric industry are not technological, but rather a lack of standards and law of public awareness.").
167. See Greene, supra note 110, at http://www. theregister.co.uk/content/6/
20966.html ("'By implementing reasonable safeguards [for government use of biometric face scanning], we can harness its power to maximize its benefits while minimizing the intrusion on individual privacy."').
168. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY
FORCE Us TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (discussing impact
of technology on privacy rights); see also Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at C18
("'Privacy is going to become the civil rights issue of this decade,' said Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., a member of the congressional privacy caucus formed last
year."); Givens, supra note 12, at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Privacy-IssuesList.htm (observing "facial recognition biometrics is one of the most alarming because it can be deployed secretly").
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Another issue concerning the use of face recognition technology is
what happens with all of the information that is gathered.' 69 Although
the government currently maintains that it automatically discards all faces
that are not a match, there is growing concern that, with the expanding
technology, the government will begin maintaining files on all of the faces
70
scanned into the databases.'
The same fears of information gathering are even more prevalent
when face recognition technology makes its way into the hands of private
citizens.17 ' Many have expressed concern that in the hands of private citizens, face recognition technology will allow the general public to maintain
vast databases of information on individuals, retrievable the moment a
face is scanned and a match is made. 17 2 This technology has the potential
to allow third parties to monitor constantly the movements of individuals,
73
thereby affording them no privacy.'
This concern over the lack of regulation led to the Congressional Privacy Caucus, formed in an effort to discuss and investigate current privacy
issues, with a focus on maintaining personal privacy. 174 Even individuals
in the industry have raised this concern over a lack of individual privacy.
At least one maker of face recognition technology has called for the regulation of its use, focusing on notifying individuals that they are being
monitored.

75

169. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 13 (disclosing that much more private
information is collected and revealed to government entities than is necessary to
achieve purpose of surveillance).
170. See id. (analyzing government's need to regulate how long it maintains
photos in system before discarding).
171. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com (discussing technology in hands of third parties); Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at
C18 ("The threat to privacy arises [from] ...the ability of third parties to access
this [personal information] .... ).
172. See Biometrics Introduction, supra note 12, at http://www.axistech.com (observing that threat to privacy arises from ability of third parties to use this technology); Digital Big Brother, supra note 4, at C18 (discussing potential abuses of
technology).
173. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 7 (divulging fears of "tracking and
clandestine capture").
174. See Senator Richard C. Shelby, Shelby Announces Formation of Congressional
Privacy Caucus, InCongress (Feb. 11, 2000), at http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/
FOIA/Privacy/Sen-Shelby-Privacy-Caucus-prsrs3l4.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002)
(explaining formation of caucus).
175. See On the Law Enforcement Alliance of America's Opposition to Face Recognition
Software, Law Enforcement Alliance of Am. (July 3, 2001), at http://
www.notbored.org/leaa.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2002) (discussing call for
regulation).
In September 1998, the International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA)
was formed and currently has a membership of twenty-seven companies. See Biometrics and Privacy: Industry Policy on Crowd Surveillance, supra note 110, at http://
www.ibia.org/pressreleasel9.htm (outlining formation of IBIA). The organization
is open to all manufacturers and users of biometric technology who "agree to
abide by the IBIA Statement of Principles and Code of Ethics." Id. On March 24,
1999, IBIA adopted a set of privacy principles that were aimed at encouraging
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Congress must establish a set of guidelines that regulate the use of
this technology by both the government and private citizens. 176 As the
makers of the technology have recognized the need for regulation, there
is no doubt that the legislature is not far behind. I 77 Furthermore, although the use of face recognition technology remains untested in the
court system, its expansion virtually assures that it will not remain untested
1 78
for long.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As early as 1963, the late Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. "warned that 'electronic surveillance makes the police omniscient, and
police omniscience is one of the most effective tools of tyranny."'1 79 With
the development of face recognition technology, and the capabilities it
possesses, an issue arises as to whether the Constitution is equipped to
biometric manufacturers and users to take steps to secure the data collected by
biometric systems. See id. (exploring privacy principles). These guidelines are designed to apply to manufacturers, customers and users of the new technology. See
id. (disclosing goal of guidelines). The guidelines are:
1. Biometric data is electronic code that is separate and distinct from
personal information, and provides an effective, secure barrier
against unauthorized access to personal information. Beyond this inherent protection, IBIA recommends safeguards to ensure that biometric data is not misused to compromise any information, or
released without personal consent or the authority of law.
2. In the private sector, IBIA advocates the development of policies that
clearly set forth how biometric data will be collected, stored, accessed, and used, and that preserve the rights of individuals to limit
the distribution of the data beyond the stated purposes.
3. In the public sector, IBIA believes that clear legal standards should
be developed to carefully define and limit the conditions under
which agencies of national security and law enforcement may acquire, access, store, and use biometric data.
4. In both the public and private sectors, IBIA advocates the adoption of
appropriate managerial and technical controls to protect the confidentiality and integrity of databases containing biometric data.
id.
176. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 13 (calling for "specific protocols" regarding use of this new technology); Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.
swiss.ai.mit.edu/6.805/student-papers/fal199-papers/prevost-biometrics.htm
(describing need for regulation of technology).
177. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 13 (stressing need for "strict controls
to safeguard information"); Prevost, supra note 6, at http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/
6.805/student-papers/fa199-papers/prevost-biometrics.htm ("What is needed is
for policy makers ...and engineers of biometric systems.., to collaborate ....
").
178. See Kasindorf, supra note 4, at A3 (observing face recognition technology
remains untested in court); Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter. com/
columns/COL_20010718.html (highlighting that Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
which protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination,
have never been invoked against blanket surveillance of whole population).
179. Diana Ray, Big Brother Is Watching You, INSIGHT ON NEws, July 23, 2001, at
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protect Americans adequately against such tyranny. I8 °1 The unique characteristics of this technology make it difficult to apply existing case law in
order to determine its legality. 181 Although the Constitution was drafted
in such a way that it allows the law to metamorphasize as society and technology advance, case law has yet to address the unique problems face rec18 2
ognition technology raises.
In the hands of the government, face recognition technology may be
the most cutting edge way for police to track criminals and terrorists, but
in the hands of individual citizens, this technology presents a variety of
privacy issues including access to personal information and the ability to
track or pinpoint an individual's movements. 18 3 In the end, when deciding whether face recognition technology is constitutional, citizens and the
courts may be forced to weigh their desire to feel secure in their own
84
homes against the value they place on their privacy.'
Bridget Mallon

180. See generally Alexander T. Nguyen, Comment, Here's Looking at You Kid:
Has Face-Recognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 2 (2002) (analyzing problems created by face recognition technology).
181. For a discussion of the existing case law, see supra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.
182. See Barber, supra note 2, at http://www.chipcenter.com/columns/
COL_20010718.html (identifying "no laws on the books" and no legal remedies in
courts); Nuger, supra note 5, at http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_ consideration.html (commenting that this new technology has yet to be addressed in court).
183. See WOODWARD, supra note 110, at 7 (analyzing issues surrounding face
recognition technology); Givens, supra note 12, at http://www.privacyrights.org/
ar/Privacy-IssuesList.htm (analyzing face recognition technology).
184. See CNN Live This Morning, supra note 110 (discussing privacy concerns
surrounding face recognition technology). Although the issue has not yet been
addressed by the courts, some have already considered the possible conflicts. See
id. (noting problems arising from use of technology). Addressing a law school in
New York, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asked "when does the
legislation that we pass to hinder terrorism become so overwhelming that it takes
away our civil liberties . . .this is what we have to be on the look out for." Id.
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